December 11, 2007

FOR 15 YEARS in my various government and parliament duties for the State of Israel, I have been closely tracking Iran's nuclear program. I do so because I consider it a threat to the international community and an existential threat to my country.

 

Frankly, the headlines about the recent National Intelligence estimate on Iran - "Iran Halted Nuclear Arms Effort in 2003" - stunned me. After a thorough reading of the published parts of the NIE, I pose three questions to its authors, whom I don't know but I do respect.

 

You wrote, "Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapon program. Iran made a significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges in Natanz. . ." And, "Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing a nuclear weapon, if a decision is made to do so."
 

If uranium enrichment and development of those technologies continues, what exactly was halted in the fall of 2003?

Two ingredients are mainly required for a nuclear bomb: fissile material and a special explosion device.

 

The production of the fissile material requires large, easily detectable industrial facilities like the one in Natanz. To develop and produce the weapon device, however, only a small plant is enough, a plant whose size and contours are similar to any innocent laboratory. That is what is called "the weapon group." Only the absolute dismantling of the "weapon group" can be considered as "halting nuclear weapons program." Can you say with confidence that such a laboratory does not exist anywhere in Iran? Is your coverage of Iran so total and intrusive as to justify such a conclusion?
 

The report said, "We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so." But, you also write that ". . .We don't know whether [Iran] currently intends to develop nuclear weapons." And, "We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Teheran is willing to maintain the halt."

 

If you don't have enough knowledge about the regime's intention, and that is understandable, how do you know, or will you know, that such a decision has not been taken or implemented?
 

You wrote, "A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that the efforts probably were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007."

 

You say "probably." But your judgment that Teheran had not "restarted its nuclear weapon program as of mid-2007" can be based only on the assumption that nowhere in Iran is there an active covert nuclear program. Are you sure?
 

According to the NIE, "sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame" Iran would have enough enriched uranium for a weapon. The ballistic missiles that can deliver such a weapon to Israel, as well as Gulf and European countries, are already operational.

 

We can't wait for answers to my questions. This National Intelligence Estimate, about which there are legitimate questions, may well reduce the likelihood that additional and tougher international sanctions will be imposed on Iran. We would then have to rely on ourselves.

 

Ephraim Sneh, a retired Israeli general and a former deputy minister of defense, is a member of the Israeli Knesset's sub-committee on intelligence.