Syria will act to keep control over Lebanon in the traditional ways developed during the civil war

By Ephraim Sneh

Images from Beirut of the "democratic revolution" underway are enough to warm the heart of every Israeli. The mere sight of tens of thousands of demonstrators, demanding independence after three decades of Syrian brutality, is a joyous one indeed. The fall of Omar Karameh's government, after massive public pressure, is an historic benchmark in a country where politics has always been defined by the barrel of a Kalashnikov.
 
On first glance, popular pressure to oust Syria from Lebanon is a positive development for Israel. After all, anything that challenges Syrian interests must necessarily improve ours. But a deeper look at events transpiring in Lebanon suggest it is far too early to rejoice.
 
Syria will not willingly relinquish control of Lebanon, and not only because of the huge financial kickbacks senior Syrian officials receive as a result of the occupation. From Syria's perspective, Lebanon is a defensive buffer, as well as a springboard from which to annoy Israel, or even a staging ground from which to attack the Jewish state.
 
Part of Greater Syria
 
Upon even deeper analysis-that of Syria's ruling Ba'ath Party -there is no place in the region for an independent Lebanon. To them, Lebanon is part of Greater Syria.
 
Should Bashar Assad lose Lebanon, he will be regarded as weak amongst the Alawite hierarchy from which he sprang, who will then question the wisdom of leaving him in power in Syria. If Assad caves in to opposition pressure in Lebanon, goes the argument, then what hope do we have that he will protect the Alawite minority in Syria (about 12 percent of the population) against the might of Syria's Sunni majority (about 80 percent)?
 
Therefore, Syria will do everything in its power to maintain its control over Lebanon, using all the "traditional" means developed during the long years of Lebanon's civil war.
 
Against the Sunni-Christian-Druze coalition behind the current demonstrations, Damascus can position Lebanon's large Shi'ite majority, including Hizbullah , as well as Palestinian groups. Hizbullah maintains a powerful military presence in Lebanon, financed by Iran but reliant on Syria for logistical support. Furthermore, Syria has donated several long-range missiles to Hizbullah.
 
Hizbullahland
 
At present, two possible developments should worry us. First is the outbreak of hostilities between Shi'ite Hizbullah and other political and religious factions. Such a conflict could trickle down our way.
 
The second is the creation of a semi-independent, Hizbullah-controlled region in South Lebanon, under the direct influence of Syria and Iran. South Lebanon is already rightly known as "Hizbullahland," but further isolation of the region could lead to a show of military strength and result in rocket attacks from across the northern border.
 
From a regional perspective, there is a link between this process and rising Iranian influence over the Shi'ite majority in Iraq - the same regime that is developing nuclear weapons, supports Islamic Jihad, and provides a sizeable bonus to terror groups for each Israeli killed in a terror attack.
 
On the positive side, developments in Lebanon do require sober vision, open eyes and readiness. We must not rely on the international community to coax Syria into any hasty decisions.