His Excellency Ephraim Sneh
Deputy Minister of Defense
Israel

 

 

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
I will use this opportunity to explain the main goals of our government, the government of Israel, headed by Ehud Barak. I will try to give a short [perspective] on how successful we are in obtaining this objective. The main and most important goal of our government is to put an end to the Israeli-Arab conflict. It's a very ambitious goal, but we think that after fifty-two years of Israel's existence we have to try to use the changes in the global strategic situation, the changes in the region, and build a safer environment for Israel by having peace with all our neighbors.

 

The effort to reach this peace goes on in two tracks: the Syrian track and the Palestinian track. What are our conditions in a possible negotiation with Syria? We actually want to achieve two things. One: that the national water resources will be kept in our control. I speak mainly about the Sea of Galilee, or the Sea of Tiberias or the Kinneret, as we call it. In this lake we have 35 percent of our drinking water, and we insist that it remain in our own control. The second demand, or the second condition, is that the future border with Syria would be a defensible border. To remind you, Syria attacked Israel three times, and even when there is a peace agreement with Syria we would like to be sure that no surprise attack is possible against Israel from the Syrian side. That's why, when we say defensible border, we mean diffusion of Syrian troops beyond the Golan Heights, which must be kept totally demilitarized, and an early warning station on the mountain. That's what we demand, and we don't think that it is exaggerated.

 

More than that, we expressed our readiness, though it's a painful price to relinquish most of the territory in the Golan Heights that we conquered in the War of 1967, to relinquish it to Syria and President Assad knows it. So what did Clinton offer in the meeting last Sunday? Why did this historic meeting fail? Because it's come out that President Assad doesn't want to negotiate an agreement, he wants to dictate it. We don't accept this mechanism of negotiation. I'm sure that none of you in his business, in his private life, started a negotiation with full acceptance of the maximum demands of the other side. It isn't done. So the State of Israel, the government of Israel, refused to accept this mechanism because what [Assad] demanded is that Israel, that Prime Minister Barak, would be committed to a full withdrawal from the entire Golan Heights guaranteed by the President of the United States and if we do it then the negotiation would stop. No way. 
 

But it is not a question of manners, procedure and good relationship. In substance, Assad rejected our two main demands. He rejected and prohibits negotiations. He wants to touch, in the water of the Sea of Galilee, direct access to this water reservoir of ours. He rejects the presence of a single Israeli soldier or the condition of the early warning systems, those early warning systems which are supposed to give us early enough information about movements of the Syrian army to the Israeli border. We cannot accept [his position].

More than that, Prime Minister Barak gave a promise to the Israeli people during his campaign that the draft of the agreement with Syria would be submitted to the Israeli people for decision, for approval, in referendum. There is no chance that the Israeli people would approve a bad agreement, and for the time being, since this is the Syrian approach, the chances of success are quite slim.

 

Something must be very clearly put here. We the government, and Barak personally, went out of his way to resume the talks with Syria with the hope that it would be concluded successfully. Why? Because we know that if it fails, if there is no peace, a war may come. We want to be sure that we did everything possible, that we did our utmost in order to prevent such a war, because at the moment before we will be able to look into the eyes of our soldiers, of every soldier and his family, and to say "We did everything possible that you would not go to this war, but if you have to we are sure that you will fight and succeed and win." This is a responsibility that an honest, responsible Israeli government must take upon itself. To do the utmost to prevent war. Peace, but finally, not at all costs. This was our promise to the Israelis, those who voted for us, those who didn't vote for us and we keep this promise. Peace, all the efforts are worth lives, but not at all costs.

 

When I speak about the second track, the Israeli-Palestinian track, I can be more optimistic, and why? It's very clear, it's obvious, that in this case both leaderships, the Israeli as well as the Palestinian, is sincerely committed to the idea of peace. Arafat [and] the Palestinian leadership, they are seriously committed and interested in peace with the Jewish state, and when there is good will on both sides and readiness to negotiate on both sides, there is a good chance for success. When it comes to combating terrorism, so far the Palestinian Authority is doing quite a good job. Do they deserve a mark of "A?" No. "B+?" Maybe. Last month we succeeded, both our intelligence services and the Palestinian intelligence services, to intercept one of the most dangerous squads of the Hamas extremist Islamic organization. If we hadn't succeeded, many, many, hundreds of casualties could have been victims of this fanatic organization, which is committed to destroying the peace process. 
 

So, they cooperate with us in this vital fight against terrorism, but there is one more profound reason why an Israeli-Palestinian peace is feasible. Here we also have demands, we have red lines that we can't cross, and I will mention them briefly: not to divide Jerusalem again, full demilitarization of the West Bank and Gaza, and Israeli defense lines along the Jordan River. These are our ultimatum demands. We don't want another barbed-wire fence and mine fields in the middle of Jerusalem, [but] we want to be able to defend, in any worst-care scenario, our country from a convenient defense line. We don't want the tanks, artillery, missiles, deployed close to the population centers of Israel. It's Jerusalem and security. Those conditions are not incompatible with Palestinian national desires. They're reconcilable with what basically the Palestinians want, so we can build the bridge between our security conditions and the aspirations of the Palestinians. I am sure that it's workable.

 

It takes good will, creativity and patience. If we succeed in this year in concluding successfully one negotiation with one of our neighbors, more probably with the Palestinians in this case, it means we would be able to change again the Middle Eastern equation. No more Israel on one side and all the Arab countries on the other side. The demarcation line in the region doesn't go any more between Israel and the rest of the countries. It's a new demarcation line, but more than that it's the ability to build a new strategic configuration in the Middle East. We would be able to build an alliance of those countries in the Middle East which are committed to the peace process, friendly to the United States, ready to take part in a collective endeavor to economic development of the region and to [isolate] the "crazy states." This is the new demarcation line that we can draw if we have a break-through with the Palestinians.
 

It's important for the United States because, in a Middle East which is organized according to the guidelines that I just mentioned, it is easier and cheaper to protect the interests of the United States of America. We started it in the days of Rabin's government. We succeeded in rebuilding this configuration where Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Turkey, were at the center of this structure, of this configuration, but other countries in the Gulf, in North Africa, joined and broadened this configuration. We can do it again.

 

Speaking about the region, and about the rogue regimes, I have to emphasize the dangers, the new dangers that these countries pose to Israel--but not to only to Israel. As you know, Iraq for almost two years [has been] out of international inspection. The United Nations observers were expelled and there is no inspection of the Iraqi preparation of nuclear weapons, of long-range missiles. We have good enough reasons to believe that Saddam Hussein takes advantage of this darkness in which he lives now. No one knows really what's going on there, and we have to assume that he is working very hard, as in the past, on preparing missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. Not tomorrow, not this year, but we know that in 1991 in the Gulf War he was very, very close to obtaining this objective--to build a nuclear bomb. The man is there, the know-how is there, the technology is there, and we have to do our best to renew the mechanism, the organization of inspection at least to slow down his preparation.
 

With Iran we face a very dangerous threat. North Korea and Russia helped the regime to build quite quickly long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear bombs. No one is doing anything serious to stop them from spreading the technology to Iran, and Iran may accomplish this effort even in four years time--according to some estimates by the year 2005. We, as a Jewish state, cannot ignore the combination of a regime inspired by a crazy, anti-Jewish and anti-Israel ideology and weapons of mass destruction. If we ignore it, if we deny it, if we belittle the danger, it means that we learned nothing from our recent history.

 

It's a mistake and delusion to believe that the result of the recent elections in Iran made any substantial difference. As far as we know, the current regime didn't change even slightly. We hear rhetoric all the time against Israel, against the legitimacy of a Jewish state in the Middle East, and it didn't slow down the preparation to build those weapons of mass destruction, destruction that they just now described. The change in Iran is among the people. The people of Iran are sick and tired of the regime, of its theocracy, of those clergymen who control so cruelly their society. But this is the people, the masses. It's not the regime. The regime is unchanged and even those who are considered as moderate, like the president, is an integral part of the religious establishment which conduct all those efforts. It's an illusion to think that by giving some or lifting some sanctions or allowing them to send carpets, caviar and pistachios, one can [reduce] even slightly the danger that this regime poses for Israel and on other allies of the United States in the region.
 

If somebody wants to do something is [would be] to encourage the Iranian people, not the Iranian regime. We in Israel make this distinction because we were very friendly with the Iranian people in the past and I am sure that we will be in the future in good friendly relations with them, but the trouble is the current regime. We cannot ignore the many dangers that they very diligently build every day, every night, aimed at our country. We don't ask anyone to protect us; we just want to have the ability to build the proper defense layer with our own skills, with our talent, with our own efforts. In the meantime, we will continue to work very very hard to gain success at least in one track of the peace process, in the Palestinian track in the first place, but as far as we are concerned we don't slam any door, and if Assad wants to come back to negotiations to resume it we would welcome him.

Thank you very much.